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I. INTRODUCTION
Mexico can no longer afford to prosecute illegal drug users.1
Due to a failing law enforcement system with a severe shortage of
resources, the Mexican government maintains that its long-stand-
ing policy of prosecuting small-scale drug possession has detracted
from more important initiatives such as drug trafficking, related
* J.D. candidate, University of Miami School of Law; B.A., 2007, University of
Central Florida.
1. See Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Moves Quietly to Decriminalize Minor Drug Use,
L.A. TiMEs (June 21, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/jun/21/world/fgmexico
decriminalize2 1?pg=2.
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violence, and police corruption.2 More specifically, the Mexican
government has recognized that prosecuting casual drug users
and addicts has only squandered law enforcement resources and
promoted police corruption through extortion and improper shake-
downs.' Consequently, in August 2009, Mexico's Congress decrim-
inalized the possession of small amounts of illegal drugs.4 The
decriminalization policy has generated many proponents and
opponents in Mexico and the U.S. Mexico has been a haven for
drug trafficking for generations, and Mexican drug cartels exert
more power and influence now than ever before.5 Mexico's most
efficient use of its meager law enforcement resources is seemingly
targeting well-established drug trafficking organizations.' Indeed,
drug addicts and casual users in Mexico are far more prevalent
and less dangerous than those involved in trafficking drugs in
high volumes.' In contrast, allowing Mexican citizens and interna-
tional tourists to carry illegal drugs free of criminal sanctions may
carry numerous consequences that were not foreseen by the Mexi-
can government.8 These potential consequences are the source of
firm ideological differences between opposing policy-makers with
respect to Mexico's decriminalization policy.
Decriminalizing small-scale drug possession in Mexico is far
from foolish. Drug trafficking organizations have thrived under
traditional "zero tolerance" drug policy for decades, which has
resulted in unprecedented police corruption and violence. The
prosecution of small-scale drug users has encouraged the
underpaid and underequipped police officers throughout Mexico to
prey on nonviolent drug addicts in the form of extortion and
2. See loan Grillo, Mexico's New Drug Law May Set an Example, TIME (Aug. 26,
2009), http://time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1918725,00.html.
3. See, e.g., Mark Stevenson, Mexico Decriminalizes Small-Scale Drug
Possession, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 21, 2009, 7:49 AM), http://rawstory.comblog/?s=
mexico%2Bdrug.
4. See Grillo, supra note 2.
5. See Mark Potter, Mexico's 'War Next Door' Linked Directly to the United States,
MSNBC (Dec. 13, 2010), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/39812764/ns/worldnews-
americas; see also Jason C. Carney, Meth, Mexico, and Mutuality: Reemphasizing a
Transnational Approach to Fighting the Methamphetamine Epidemic in the United
States, 15 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 97, 130 (2007).
6. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
7. See Wilkinson, supra note 1. The Mexican government has changed its
perspective and concluded that casual drug users are generally non-violent and do not
present a threat to the state. Numerous in-depth studies have revealed the nonviolent
nature of casual drug users and even hardcore addicts. See, e.g., Craig Horowitz,
Drugs Are Bad: The Drug War is Worse, NEW YORK MAGAZINE, Feb. 5, 1996, at 22,
available at http://www.marijuanalibrary.org/ nymag-worse_020596.html.
8. See Wilkinson, supra note 1.
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improper shake-downs in the field This has destroyed the integ-
rity of law enforcement and distracted police forces from pursuing
the drug trafficking organizations that are responsible for nearly
30,000 deaths since Mexican President Felipe Calderon declared
war on drug cartels in 2006.10 Furthermore, with an extreme
shortage of law enforcement resources and almost a half million
hardcore drug addicts in Mexico, it has proved near impossible to
effectively address the drug-trafficking dilemma while prosecut-
ing small-scale drug possession.11 The Mexican government has
duly recognized that decriminalizing small-scale drug possession
can assist in battling drug trafficking by reducing police corrup-
tion and conserving law enforcement resources.12
However, Mexico's drug trafficking dilemma should not be
underestimated, and the Mexican government cannot expect the
decriminalization policy alone to effect lasting change.
Decriminalization of small-scale drug possession addresses only a
fraction of drug trafficking-related concerns that have over-
whelmed Mexican law enforcement initiatives for decades." This
note argues that, while Mexico's decriminalization policy should
be considered a positive step in addressing numerous drug traf-
ficking-related concerns, it is an under-inclusive measure that will
not have a major impact on Mexico's drug war. Part II of this note
illustrates the pervasive drug trafficking and related violence
resulting from Mexico's drug war. Part III outlines the inadequacy
of Mexico's law enforcement resources that inspired the
decriminalization policy. Part IV presents the terms and provi-
sions of the decriminalization policy, which has been codified in
Mexico's General Law of Health.14 Part V provides an in-depth
9. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
10. Tim Johnson, Mexico Rethinks Drug Strategy as Death Toll Soars, McCLATCHY
NEWSPAPERS (Aug. 12, 2010), http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2010/08/12/99089/mexico-
rethinks-drug-strategy.html. President Calderon's 2006 declaration of war on drug
cartels has since been referred to as Mexico's drug war. See Mexico Says 28,000 Killed
in Drugs War Since 2006, BBC NEWS, (Aug. 4, 2010, 5:57 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/
news/world-latin-america-10860614 [hereinafter 28,000 Killed in Drug War]. Many
commentators have considered Mexico's drug war to be an utter failure based on the
escalating violence and corruption scandals since 2006. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
11. Latin America Moves to Decriminalize Drugs, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 2, 2009), http:/
/www.latimes.coninews/opinionfla-ed-druglaws2-2009sep02,0,46 2 3 2 5 7 .story
[hereinafter Latin America Moves to Decriminalize].
12. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
13. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
14. See Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, arts. 478,
479, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
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analysis of the decriminalization policy, and its likely effect on
Mexico's drug war. Finally, Part VI concludes this note.
II. CURRENT STATE OF MEXICO: DRUG TRAFFICKING
AND RELATED VIOLENCE
A. Drug Trafficking in Mexico
In order to fully appreciate the drug trafficking dilemma Mex-
ico hopes to correct by decriminalizing the possession of illegal
drugs, a discussion of the current state of the country is helpful.
The United Nations estimated that illegal drug trafficking is a
$300 billion per year industry worldwide.' 5 A major source of this
outrageous volume is Mexico, which has historically been a leader
in illegal drug trafficking and drug-related violence.16 Mexico was
responsible for producing 15,500 metric tons of marijuana in 2007
alone.17 Further, over eight metric tons of heroin are produced
yearly in Mexico. 8 Moreover, shipments of cocaine come into Mex-
ico by the ton through Central America for export into the U.S. 9
Mexico is also a major producer and distributor of
methamphetamine. 20 Since Mexico's drug war began in 2006, Mex-
ican police and military have seized roughly 84,000 weapons;
35,000 vehicles; and confiscated more than $400 million in sus-
pected drug money. 21 Despite these figures, drug trafficking orga-
nizations continue to succeed in marketing their products
throughout the country, as there are currently over 460,000
hardcore drug addicts in Mexico. 2
Drug trafficking in Mexico has become an enormous concern
for the U.S., where consumption of cocaine, marijuana, heroin,
and other illegal drugs has steadily grown despite President
15. Latin America Moves to Decriminalize, supra note 11.
16. See AGNES GEREBEN SCHAEFER ET AL., SECURITY IN MEXICO: IMPLICATIONS FOR
U.S. POLICY OPTIONS (RAND Corp. 2009).
17. Id. at xvi.
18. Mary Anastasia O'Grady, Drug Gangs Have Mexico on the Ropes, WALL ST. J.,
(Jan. 26, 2009), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123292962031814007.html.
19. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 22.
20. See Carney, supra note 5, at 98-99. Methamphetamine use can be more
harmful and addicting than heroin and cocaine. Id. at 98. Further, the prevalence of
methamphetamine is increasingly problematic because its production can be just as
harmful as its use due to the nature of the synthetic chemicals used. Id.
21. See 28,000 Killed in Drug War, supra note 10. The Mexican law enforcement's
seizure of weapons should be considered a promising accomplishment for the drug
war. However, law enforcement corruption is so pervasive that the weapons seized
may very well be returned to traffickers to commit further violence.
22. See Latin America Moves to Decriminalize, supra note 11.
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Nixon's "war on drugs" declaration in 1972.23 It is estimated that
approximately $25 billion - $30 billion worth of illegal drugs are
smuggled into the U.S. from Mexico yearly.24 Further, nearly
ninety percent of the cocaine that enters the U.S. is trafficked
through Mexico, mainly originating in Central America. Of the
15,500 metric tons of marijuana produced each year in Mexico, an
overwhelming majority is exported to the U.S.26 The U.S. is also
Mexico's largest market for methamphetamine export.27 Colom-
bian drug trafficking organizations have developed arrangements
with Mexican traffickers to move their drugs out of Colombia and
into the U.S. through the U.S.-Mexican border.28 Consequently,
drug trafficking organizations have distribution capabilities in as
many as 230 U.S. cities.29 Mexican drug trafficking organizations
focus so strongly on the U.S. for export of illegal drugs that they
have successfully corrupted U.S. border patrol agents, a practice
that appears to be growing along the border as the number of cor-
ruption investigations involving U.S. border patrol agents
increases .30
More recently, the U.S. government has determined that it
must fund Mexican law enforcement and drug trafficking initia-
tives due to the effects that trafficking has had on the U.S. This is
not surprising as the U.S. Department of Justice, in its 2009
National Drug Threat Assessment, stated that "Mexican drug traf-
ficking organizations represent the greatest organized crime
23. See Horowitz, supra note 7, at 22, 30.
24. SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at xvi.
25. See id. The cooperation between Mexico and Central America in cocaine
smuggling has created what many commentators refer to as the "Mexico-Central
America Corridor," which is currently the predominant passage route for cocaine flow
into the U.S. Donnie R. Marshall, The Transit Zone: Strategy and Balance, U.S.
SENATE CAUCUS ON INT'L NARCOTICS CONTROL, http://drugcaucus.senate.gov/
transitmarshall.html. This smuggling strategy probably originated as a result of
increased law enforcement in South America and the Caribbean. Id. Drug traffickers
were forced to turn to experienced Mexican smuggling organizations to export their
cocaine into the U.S. Id. These Mexican organizations now control virtually all
cocaine sold in the U.S. Id.
26. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at xvi. Special Agent Rafael Reyes, chief of
the Mexico and Central America Section of the U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration, explains that "marijuana is the king crop" for Mexican drug cartels
and it "consistently sustains marketability and profitability." Solomon Moore,
Tougher Border Can't Stop Mexican Marijuana Cartels, N.Y TIMEs, Feb. 1, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/02us/O2pot.html?_r=l.
27. SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at xvi.
28. Melvyn Levitsky, Transnational Criminal Networks and International
Security, 30 SYRACUSE J. INT'L. L. & COM. 227, 233 (2003).
29. See O'Grady, supra note 18.
30. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at xvii.
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threat to the U.S."'" Additionally, Michael Hayden, former direc-
tor of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency under President
George W. Bush, called Mexico's current state one of the largest
threats to American national security, second only to Al Qaeda
and on the same level as nuclear-armed Iran.2 Further, the U.S.
Joint Forces Command, in its latest report on possible security
risks to the U.S., considered Mexico and Pakistan together as
being at risk of a "rapid and sudden collapse."33 To address this
ongoing dilemma, the U.S. government finalized a multi-year pro-
gram in October 2007 to provide the Mexican government over
$1.6 billion to combat drug trafficking, termed the "Merida
Initiative."34
B. Violence Stemming from Drug Trafficking in
Mexico
Violence resulting from Mexico's drug trafficking concerns
has been devastating in recent years. Since Mexican President
Felipe Calderon took office in 2006, drug trafficking organizations
in Mexico are responsible for more than 28,000 deaths.35 Through-
31. SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 45.
32. Judith Miller, Are Our Crime Fighters Becoming 'Mexicanized'?, Fox NEWS,
Oct. 27, 2009, http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2009/10/27/judith-miller-mexico-drug-
gangs-america-crime/.
33. Mexico Biggest Crime Threat to U.S.?, CBS NEWS, Jan. 9, 2009, http://www.cbs
news.com/stories/2009/01/19/world/main4734169.shtml?source=RSSattr=HOME_473
4169.
34. U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid to Mexico, CNN INT'L., Aug. 6, 2009, http:ll
edition.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/americas/08/05/mexico.aid/index.html [hereinafter
U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid]. Thus far, the Merida Initiave funds have been
dispersed as follows: in 2008, an initial $400 million for Mexico and $65 million for
Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti; in 2009, $300 million for Mexico
and $110 million for Central America, the Dominican Republic, and Haiti. U.S. DEP'T
OF STATE, BUREAU OF INT'L NARCOTICS & LAW ENFORCEMENT, MERIDA INITIATIVE:
FACTS SHEET, (June 26, 2009), available at http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/fs/
122397.htm [hereinafter MERIDA INITIATIVE: FACTS SHEET]. Through the Merida
Initiative funding, the U.S. hoped to impose its aggressive "war on drugs" policy on
the Mexican government. See U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid, supra. Incidentally,
the recent decriminalization of drug possession in Mexico is a large deviation from
U.S. policy, which could conceivably affect the disbursement of the remainder of the
Merida Initiative. Notwithstanding, the Obama administration has requested an
additional $450 million for Mexico and $100 million for Central America from
Congress for 2010. See MERIDA INITIATIVE: FACTS SHEET, supra.
35. See Johnson, supra note 10. Along with the outrageous number of deaths
stemming from Mexico's drug war, the methods by which these murders are carried
out illustrate the overwhelming nature of drug-related violence in the country. In
some cases, coroners cannot accurately determine the cause of death of certain
murder victims because their bodies reveal numerous injuries that would each cause
death independently, including bullet wounds, stab wounds, asphyxiation, blood loss,
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out this time period, the trend has been a steady increase in vio-
lence throughout Mexico. The 2,300 drug trafficking-related
deaths in 2007 more than doubled to over 6,300 deaths in 2008.36
Further, there were over 2,000 deaths in 2009 from January to
April alone. 37 Estimates have indicated that drug-related violence
in Mexico results in fifteen deaths per day. 38 Primarily, these
deaths stem from turf battles between competing drug cartels and
tension between the cartels and law enforcement.3 9 As the U.S. is
the primary market for drugs produced and stored in Mexico, rival
drug trafficking organizations wage war over smuggling routes
into the U.S., and the resulting dead bodies are discovered along
the U.S.-Mexican border, primarily in the U.S. states of Texas and
Arizona.4"
Much of the violence resulting from Mexico's drug war is
directed toward law enforcement.4 An extraordinary number of
Mexican police officers have lost their lives while attempting to
carry out President Calderon's goal of cracking down on drug-traf-
ficking. Drug trafficking organizations are now targeting police
forces more than ever because of this newly inspired law enforce-
ment focus on ending trafficking.42 Cartels have recently taken the
approach that high-level police forces must be corrupted or
killed.43 A vicious cycle has been created by the connection
between violence upon the police and corruption in Mexico:
because the goal of traffickers is to corrupt the entirety of the
Mexican law enforcement at all levels, those honorable officers
who wish to maintain order and integrity will almost certainly be
murdered by traffickers as recent history has proved. More than
and decapitation. Mexico Morgues Crowded with Drug-War Dead, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Mar. 8, 2009, 2:02 PM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/29583080.
36. Mexico Senate OKs Bill to Legalize Drug Possession, REUTERS (Apr. 28, 2009),
http://www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSN2834952 2 [hereinafter Mexico
Senate OKs Bill].
37. Id.
38. Jonathan Hunt, Top General Says Mexico Is Winning Drug Wars That Claim
15 Lives Every Day, Fox NEWS (Feb. 2, 2009), http://www.foxnews.comstory/
0,2933,487010,00.html.
39. See U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid, supra note 34.
40. See Mexico Senate OKs Bill, supra note 36; see also Jerry Brewer, 'Spillover'
Violence Ranges Beyond the U.S.-Mexico Border, MEXIDATA INFO (Mar. 22, 2010),
http://www.mexidata.info/id2593.html.
41. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 2-3.
42. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at xiv.
43. See id.
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500 police officers were killed in 2008 alone.44 Traffickers are vir-
tually exterminating the few remaining clean state police officers
and government officials in Mexico, which has created a state with
unprecedented corruption.45
While the vast majority of drug-related violence in Mexico
involves members of drug trafficking organizations and law
enforcement, a staggering number of innocent citizens are dying
in the drug war as well.41 Many innocent victims, including chil-
dren, are inadvertently shot and killed in the crossfire between
law enforcement and drug traffickers due to the constant war zone
that this drug war has created. 47 These drug-related shootouts and
turf battles are becoming more prevalent throughout the country,
including areas frequented by international tourists, such as
Acapulco.4" Additionally, innocents are often mistaken for mem-
bers of rival drug cartels or law enforcement and are murdered as
a result.49 Most commonly, drug traffickers kill innocents merely
to send a message. Traffickers often murder the loved ones of
rivals and law enforcement officers to inform any potential adver-
saries that their operations are not to be interfered with." In such
44. See id. See discussion infra Part III for specific examples of the prevalent
violence upon Mexican law enforcement officers.
45. See discussion infra Part III for a more comprehensive overview of the
corruption epidemic in Mexico.
46. Id.
47. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3; see also Melissa Del Bosque, Mexico's
Future in 2010, Calderon's Failed Drug War, TExAs OBSERVER (Jan. 5, 2010), http:l!
www.texasobserver.org/lalinea/calderons-war-on-drugs-is-a-failure.
48. See Ken Ellingwood, Deadly Street Shootout Strikes Fear in Acapulco, L.A.
TIMES (Apr. 14, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/apr/14/world/la-fg-acapulco-
shootingl5-2010apr15. In June 2009, a shootout between suspected drug cartel
members and law enforcement occurred on a popular hotel strip road in Acapulco,
which resulted in eighteen casualties. Id. Although no tourists were harmed, the
shooting occurred at a popular location for international tourism. Id.
49. See Chris Hawley, Gunmen Kill 18 at Mexico Rehab Center, U.S.A. TODAY
(Sept. 4, 2009), http://www.usatoday.com/news/world/2009-09-03-mexico-slayings-N.
htm. In their quest for power and exclusivity, drug cartels have shown their
willingness to execute large groups of innocents where there is only a slight
possibility that the victims might be enemies. For instance, in September 2009, drug
traffickers broke into a rehabilitation center in the Mexican state of Chihuahua and
shot eighteen patients to death execution-style after receiving word that a rival drug
cartel member was hiding out in the facility. Id.
50. See generally Tracy Wilkinson, Mexico Drug Raid Hero's Family Slaughtered,
L.A. TIMES (Dec. 23, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/dec/23/world/la-fg-mexico-
revenge-attack23-2009dec23. In December 2009, suspected members of the Zeta drug
cartel executed the entire family of a Mexican soldier who participated in a raid of the
cartel's hideout. Id. The soldier was shot to death in the raid, and only hours after his
funeral, where he was honored for his dedication to law enforcement, his mother,
sister, brother, and aunt were all murdered by masked gunmen. Id.
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cases, traffickers often leave threatening notes at the scene or
even carve references in the flesh of the corpses.5' While bloody
feuds between rival drug cartels have been customary in Mexico
for decades, the drug war has now turned the entire country into a
battlefield where innocent lives are lost every day.
III. THE MEXICAN LAW ENFORCEMENT FAILURE
The Mexican government has virtually given up on prosecut-
ing small-time drug users and addicts in part because the Mexi-
can law enforcement and national security institutions are
frightfully underequipped, unorganized, and corrupt.52 A predomi-
nant motive for Mexico's decriminalization legislation, a radical
deviation from drug law precedent, is that it would be unreasona-
ble to expend such limited and poorly structured law enforcement
efforts on drug addicts who are far less of a threat to society than
those responsible for trafficking drugs in and out of the country.53
A. A Lack of Coordination Among Mexican Law
Enforcement Branches
Since the 2000 presidential election of Vicente Fox, Mexico's
law enforcement has been in a state of chaos due to lack of an
organized, broad national security strategy. The Mexican govern-
ment spends what little means it has on law enforcement equip-
ment and infrastructure rather than training police officers of
separate branches to properly carry out a limited scope of duties.54
Further, the 1,661 police departments in Mexico commonly keep
information they may have acquired to themselves and fail to
inform others of their plans.55 This lack of organization within fed-
eral, state, and local law enforcement agencies has led to constant
shifting and overlapping of responsibilities.56 The result has been
confusion, tension, and hostility across separate police forces and
failed law enforcement.57 Mexico has a total of 370 police officers
per 100,000 citizens while the U.S. has only 225 police officers per
100,000.58 This disorganization in Mexico's national security sys-
51. See Mexico: 6 Bodies in Cave, 3 with Hearts Cut Out, CBS NEWS (June 7,
2010), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2010/06/O7/world/main6557732.shtml.
52. See, e.g., Stevenson, supra note 3.
53. See id.
54. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 17.
55. Id. at 19.
56. Id. at xiii.
57. Id.
58. Tim Padgett, Mexico's Drug War: A Cops and Choppers Story, TIME (Aug. 19,
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tem helps to explain why the U.S. is significantly more secure in
spite of the disparity in manpower.
B. Limited Law Enforcement Resources in Mexico
Police forces in Mexico are experiencing a severe shortage of
resources required to carry out justice, especially in the midst of
Mexico's drug war. Mexico suffers considerable shortcomings in
police training, equipment, prisons, courts, and drug centers for
rehabilitation of addicts. 9 While the U.S. effectively counters the
majority of organized crime through the use of technology and
wise spending, quite the opposite is true in Mexico. ° For decades,
Mexico's state governors, attorney generals, and chiefs of the
Finance Ministry have been seeking reform and improvement of
the most fundamental law enforcement resources, but the political
system has failed to strengthen the institution of law enforce-
ment. 1 Mexico is feeling this deficiency now more than ever as the
drug war has continued to spiral out of control. Since 1997, the
number of prison inmates in Mexico has doubled to more than
227,000, many of whom are drug addicts incarcerated for small-
scale drug possession.6 2 This has resulted in significant overcrowd-
ing of Mexico's prison system.63 In fact, prisons are so over-
crowded that over 40,000 inmates charged with federal crimes
have been sent to serve their sentences in state jails. 4 Under
these circumstances, ruthless hitmen for drug cartels commonly
share jail cells with petty thieves, underage inmates, and suspects
awaiting trial. 5 Further, the prison guards charged with control-
2009), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1917453,00.html?xid=rss-top
stories.
59. See Graham H. Turbiville, Jr., Law Enforcement and the Mexican Armed
Forces: The Military Undertakes New Internal Security Missions, U.S. ARMY FOREIGN
MILITARY STUDIES OFFICE (Apr. 2007), http://struggle.ws/mexico/usa/armyonmex_
army-apr97.html.
60. See Ray Walser, Mexico, Drug Cartels, and the Merida Initiative: A Fight We
Cannot Afford to Lose, HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 23, 2008), available at http:l!
www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2008/07/Mexico-Drug-Cartels-and-the-Merida-
Initiative-A-Fight-We-Cannot-Afford-to-Lose.
61. See Turbiville, supra note 59.
62. Mica Rosenberg, Corrupt, Insecure Prisons Undermine Mexico Drug War,
REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2010), http:/www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE67H43A20100818.
63. See id.; see also Ernesto Lopez Portillo, La Adiccion a la Prison, EL UNIVERSAL
(Apr. 13, 2009), http://www.eluniversal.com.mx/editoriales/43659.html. Mexico City,
for example, has a prison overcrowding rate of 100 percent.
64. See Rosenberg, supra note 62.
65. Id. The Mexican government has pledged to build fifteen new modem federal
prisons by 2012 to correct this problem, and a bulk of the funding for these new
facilities will come from the U.S. through Merida Initiative funding.
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ling the overpopulated prisons are underpaid and undertrained,
leading to corruption and complicity. In the most extreme cases,
prison guards even furnish drug traffickers with weapons and set
them free.
Mexico has also failed to create adequate witness protection
programming, which has proven to be relatively successful in the
U.S. Although witness protection programs do exist in Mexico,
hitmen for drug cartels have been able to locate and kill infor-
mants with relative ease despite governmental protection.66 Infor-
mants have even been murdered inside guarded federal "safe
houses" which function solely to protect such witnesses. Such
events stem from institutional corruption and information leaks,
and certainly act to deter other potential informants from coming
forward with information. Two major problems have resulted from
Mexico's lack of adequate witness protection programming: failure
to report crime for fear of retaliatory violence and the retaliatory
violence itself.
Mexico's shortage of law enforcement resources is com-
pounded by the fact that drug trafficking organizations are highly
adaptable and spend enormous amounts of money on technologi-
cal equipment of their own.67 This hefty income allows cartels to
outspend the Mexican government and neutralize its drug traf-
ficking initiative. With the use of heavy-duty military equipment,
drug cartels are setting up "states within the state" and enforcing
their own sets of laws. 68 These areas, isolated by roadblocks, are
protected by military-like platoons utilizing state-of-the-art night
vision goggles, electronic intercept collection, encrypted communi-
cations and information systems, sea-going midget submarines,
helicopters, automatic weaponry, mines, booby traps, fifty-caliber
sniper rifles, military-quality hand grenades, and grenade
machine guns.69 The Mexican government has identified at least
230 of these "zones of impunity" operated by drug trafficking orga-
nizations in Mexico.7 °
66. Tim Padgett, Mexico's Witness Protection Program: What Protection?, TIME
(Dec. 8, 2009), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1945983,00.html.
67. See Levitsky, supra note 28, at 233.
68. Mexican Drug Trafficking, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/
international/mexico/drug trafficking/index.html (last updated Sept. 22, 2010).
69. O'Grady, supra note 18.
70. See Mexican Drug Trafficking, supra note 68. In one such case, drug
traffickers operating a roadblock in the state of Durango opened fire on a vehicle for
failing to stop and acknowledge the member guarding the area, resulting in the death
often young students. Tracy Wilkinson & Cecilia Sanchez, 10 Youths Slain in Mexico,
L.A. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/30/worldla-fg-
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What's worse is that drug trafficking organizations have been
able to employ their technology in ways that the Mexican govern-
ment cannot, which further complicates the disparity in equip-
ment. The government is constrained by international and
domestic law, treaties, and ethical principles. 71 Additionally, the
government cannot spend without suffering through the slow-
moving budget approval process of the Mexican legislature.72 On
the other hand, drug trafficking organizations are boundless.
These organizations have more to spend and can spend immedi-
ately without requiring approval to work new technology into
their operation. 73 They are not submissive to any laws or govern-
ment and can acquire an aerial helicopter or a midget submarine
immediately without impediment.4
C. Police Corruption
Along with the gross disorganization of law enforcement and
its shortage of resources, a predominant cause of Mexico's failure
to combat trafficking is corruption within the police forces and
political arena. Federal, state, and local law enforcement branches
experience widespread corruption, creating an enormous hurdle
for national security and Mexico's drug war.75 Additionally, police
corruption has been widely alleged at every level of administra-
tion and in every Mexican state. 76 Furthermore, it is estimated
that six out of ten crimes in Mexico involve some form of police
complicity. 77 According to public opinion polls, eighty percent of
Mexico's population considers their law enforcement to be
corrupt.78
A powerful illustration of the prevalence of police corruption
in Mexico came before the U.S. Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit,
mexico-shootings30-2010mar3O. The students, ranging from eight to twenty-one in
age, were traveling to receive federal scholarships at the time of the massacre. Id.
71. See Levitsky, supra note 28, at 233-34.
72. See Levitsky, supra note 28, at 234.
73. See Levitsky, supra note 28, at 234.
74. See O'Grady, supra note 18.
75. See Turbiville, supra note 59.
76. See Turbiville, supra note 59. More than 100 state police officers in the
northern state of Nuevo Leon were suspended due to corruption-related concerns in
April 2007 alone. SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 39.
77. See Turbiville, supra note 59.
78. See Diego Cevallos, Drugs-Mexico: Police Caught Between Low Wages, Threats,
and Bribes, INTER PRESS SERVICE (June 7, 2007), http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews
=38075.
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in August 2009.' 9 Guillero Ramirez-Peyro, a former narcotics
informant for the U.S. government, appealed a U.S. Board of
Immigration (BIA) decision to remove him to Mexico."° Fearing
for his life, Ramirez-Peyro alleged that he would be tortured or
killed by law enforcement for his work as an informant if he were
forced to return to Mexico."' Ramirez-Peyro further alleged that
all levels of the Mexican police forces have illicit connections to
drug trafficking and that "Mexican authorities, including Mexico's
Federal Agency of Investigation, regularly reveal the identities of
informants to the drug cartels, which has led to at least one
informant's assassination."82 To support his allegations, Ramirez-
Peyro submitted to the court strong documentary evidence con-
firming the relationship between Mexican law enforcement, politi-
cians, and drug cartels.83 The Eighth Circuit vacated the BIA
decision to remove Ramirez-Peyro and remanded on the basis of
the 2007 U.S. State Department Country Report on Mexico, which
attested to a "deeply entrenched culture of impunity and corrup-
tion in [Mexico's governmentl, particularly at the state and local
level." 4
Combating corruption has been a top priority of the Mexican
government since the presidency of Ernesto Zedillo beginning in
1994.5 This goal has been extremely difficult to accomplish due to
the position in which Mexican police officers are put. The majority
of police officers in Mexico are underpaid, poorly trained, and com-
pletely overwhelmed by drug trafficking organizations.86 The aver-
age police officer in Mexico City earns an average of $700 per
month, as opposed to the average payroll clerk in Mexico's city
government who makes more than $900 per month. 7 Further,
"thousands of lower-ranking officers [throughout Mexico] earn
less than $250 per month and have not completed primary
school."8 Many officers are told they must buy their own guns for
work while they are earning the same amount of money as a
supermarket cashier.8 9 Meanwhile, in some areas of Mexico, lowly
79. See Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 574 F.3d 893 (8th Cir. 2009).
80. See id. at 895.
81. See id. at 896.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. See id. at 897.
85. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
86. See id.
87. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 17.
88. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
89. Ken Ellingwood, Mexico Safety Chiefs Tough Job: Policing the Police, L.A.
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ranked officers can collect $300 to $500 per day from trafficking
organizations in exchange for favors and immunity, which has
proved to be tempting." Police officer wages in Mexico are grossly
inadequate and have forced many officers into corruption, supple-
menting their income with payoffs from drug trafficking
organizations.9
Aside from the need to supplement meager income, police
officers in Mexico are commonly coerced into corruption or resig-
nation based on fear and threats of violence. In cases where drug
trafficking organizations are unsuccessful in corrupting police and
government officials, an overwhelmingly common result is mur-
der.92 In May 2008 alone, many high-ranking government officials
who remained immune to corruption were killed by trafficking
organizations, including the acting chief of the federal police, the
head of the organized crime division of the federal police, and the
head of the military body in charge of President Calderon's per-
sonal security. 93
Also in May 2008, the police chief of Ciudad Juarez was assas-
sinated just twenty-four hours after he succeeded his predecessor,
who was also murdered.94 Following these assassinations, the
entire Ciudad Juarez municipal police force resigned, requiring
emergency military presence.95 The mayor of Ciudad Juarez
appointed Roberto Orduna Cruz as the latest police chief at the
end of May 2008.96 Instead of assassinating Cruz as they did his
two predecessors, drug trafficking organizations took a different
approach. They vowed to kill a police officer every forty-eight
hours until Cruz resigned. Traffickers carried out their threat,
killing four of Cruz's deputies and several prison guards.97 Cruz
eventually resigned and fled Ciudad Juarez in February 2009,
after many others were murdered.98 This episode demonstrates
the clear control traffickers currently have over the Mexican gov-
TIMES (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/world/la-fg-mex
cops15-2008sep15,0,514108.story.
90. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
91. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
92. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
93. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
94. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
95. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 3.
96. See Marc Lacey, With Force, Mexican Drug Cartels Get Their Way, N.Y. TIMES
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ernment, as Cruz's departure from the city was most likely in his
best interest. Had he not left the Ciudad Juarez, he would likely
end up like his counterpart in the city of Chihuahua, whose head
was found in an ice cooler in front of the police station with a call-
ing card from drug traffickers in January 2009. 99
Police corruption in Mexico has become so widespread in
recent years that President Calderon has been forced to dispatch
military troops to drug-trafficking "hot-spots" all over Mexico, a
move that has been a large source of controversy in Mexico and
the U.S.100 Since taking office in 2006, President Calderon has sent
out at least 40,000 military troops and 5,000 federal police officers
nationwide to assume duties normally carried out by state police
officers. 101 The reason for this strategy is that the military and fed-
eral police of Mexico are generally viewed as better trained and
higher paid, and, thus, less susceptible to corruption than state
police officers. °2 Many commentators have charged that President
Calderon's decision to dispatch this large number of troops was an
overzealous result of his anti-crime campaign as a conservative
presidential candidate.'03 The reason for this strategy is that the
military and federal police of Mexico are generally viewed as
trustworthy and less susceptible to corruption than state police
officers. 104 According to opinion polls in Mexico, the military is the
most highly respected organization in the country aside from the
Catholic Church."5 The military has historically been utilized as
the institution of last resort when there is a failure on the part of
the state police, especially in instances of police corruption.
10 6
99. See O'Grady, supra note 18 (explaining that the calling card at the scene of
this assassination was produced by the Sinola drug cartel, which operates mainly out
of the Mexican state of Baja California). According to U.S. Attorney General Eric
Holder, the Sinola cartel alone is responsible for importing at least 200 tons of powder
cocaine between 1990 and 2008.
100. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4. Mexican military troops have been
dispatched by previous administrations to combat drug trafficking dating back to the
1960s. However, the amount of military troops that President Calderon has sent since
taking office in 2006 is largely unprecedented.
101. See Ellingwood, supra note 89.
102. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
103. See Ellingwood, supra note 48.
104. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
105. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
106. See Cevallos, supra note 78; see also Turbiville, supra note 59 (providing that
state-imposed militarization of Mexican state police divisions has been prevalent in
recent history). In 1995, Mexico's largest state of Chihuahua set in motion a program
to replace state police officers with ex-military personnel placed on "leave." Further,
the Mexican state of Tamaulipas has created a trend of hiring army officers as its
state police commanders for decades. For instance, a former Army general currently
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Surveys of Mexican citizens show that President Calderon's deci-
sion to militarize the drug trafficking initiative has been met with
a considerable amount of approval, even from some left-wing
opposition legislators. 17 Many liberal citizens of Mexico agree
that the government had no alternative but to increase the role of
the military in the drug war due to the unprecedented amount of
organized crime in Mexico.108
However, the sincerity of the Mexican military has come at a
price. Widespread concern over human rights violations has
arisen due to the dispatch of military in organized crime "hot
spots" throughout Mexico. This concern for the way the Mexican
military has treated citizens has created a large group of oppo-
nents to the militarization of Mexico's drug war.0 9 In July 2009,
Mexico's National Human Rights Commission reported the docu-
mentation of over 2,000 complaints against the Mexican military
since President Calderon's term began in December 2006.110 Those
opposing the use of military in police work argue that members of
the military are not trained to carry out policing responsibilities
and are therefore more likely to violate the human rights of the
people of Mexico."' For example, military training does not
encompass criminal investigations, dealing with civilians, or less-
than-lethal police tactics; in fact, quite the opposite. 1 2 According
to documents and interviews with victims of human rights viola-
tions, the Mexican army has tortured citizens and conducted ille-
gal raids in its pursuit of drug traffickers.' Mauricio Ibarra, lead
investigator for the National Human Rights Commission of Mex-
ico, explains that the army takes suspects back to their bases for
questioning and there are pending investigations relating to the
torture that sometimes derives from the questioning."4
runs the police force in the Mexican state of Tabasco as well. Mexican state police
agencies have strongly encouraged hiring of ex-military for police leadership positions
due to perceived insusceptibility to corruption by drug trafficking organizations.
107. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
108. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
109. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 4.
110. See Steve Fainaru & William Booth, Mexico Accused of Torture in Drug War,
WASH. POST (July 9, 2009), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/
2009/07/08/AR2009070804197.html?sid=ST20090708043333.
111. Cevallos, supra note 78.
112. See Kristin Bricker, Mexican Generals Propose a Militarized National Police
Force, NARCOSPHERE (Aug. 30, 2008, 12:36 AM), http://narcosphere.narconews.com/
notebook/kristin-bricker/2008/08/mexican-generals-propose-a-militarized-national-
police-force.
113. Fainaru & Booth, supra note 110.
114. Fainaru & Booth, supra note 110.
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Examples of violent treatment by the Mexican military have
not been sparse. In June 2007, army troops at a military check-
point in the Mexican state of Sinaloa opened fire on a vehicle,
which resulted in the death of two innocent women and three chil-
dren under the age of seven." 5 This incident led to the arrest of
three Mexican army officers and sixteen troops who "will feel the
full weight of the law."116 Additionally, in June 2009, soldiers in
the state of Guerrero reportedly stuck needles under the finger-
nails of a disabled farmer, knifed a thirteen-year-old boy in the
back, gunned down a pastor, and robbed civilians, all while
attempting to gather information about organized crime."7 Also in
June 2009, soldiers in the state of Tijuana held plastic bags over
detainees' heads and used electric shock and drowning as methods
to extract confessions from potential drug traffickers. 1 8
Consequently, many human rights activists and opposing left-
ist legislators are calling for President Calderon to withdraw the
military troops in Mexico from policing responsibilities and the
drug war."9 Indeed, President Calderon admits that his decision
to dispatch the military has created a "war zone.""12 The human
rights violations of the Mexican military have become so prevalent
that the Mexican Defense Ministry has even paid compensation to
victims.' 2 ' The Mexican military's treatment of citizens has also
been an enormous concern for U.S. policy-makers, and these
human rights violations have had a large impact on the decisions
of the U.S. to provide aid and assistance to the Mexican govern-
ment. 2  The problem of police corruption in Mexico, by requiring
the assistance of military in policing, has created all of these
peripheral obstacles in the Mexican government's ongoing battle
against drug trafficking.
115. Cevallos, supra note 78.
116. Cevallos, supra note 78.
117. Fainaru & Booth, supra note 110.
118. Fainaru & Booth, supra note 110.
119. Cevallos, supra note 78.
120. Bricker, supra note 112.
121. See Ken Ellingwood, Abuse Allegations Rise Against Mexican Army, L.A. TIMES
(Mar. 21, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/mar/21/world/fg-mexico-army2l.
122. See U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid, supra note 34 (providing that the
distribution of a portion of the Merida Initiative has been delayed as of August 2009
because of the human rights violations of the Mexican military). A precondition of the
Merida Initiative is the mandatory prosecution of police and military officers who
violate human rights, which has not occurred to the satisfaction of the U.S. Congress.
By stipulation, up to fifteen percent of the Merida Initiative funds are to be withheld
until the U.S. State Department gives the U.S. Congress a favorable report on
Mexico's human rights record.
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IV. TERMS OF MEXICO'S DECRIMINALIZATION LEGISLATION
Decades of failed law enforcement strategy relating to drug
trafficking and related violence has prompted the Mexican gov-
ernment to contemplate novel, if not radical, policy since the turn
of the century. Considering the country's severe shortage of law
enforcement resources and police misconduct toward nonviolent
drug addicts, the Mexican government decriminalized the posses-
sion of small amounts of narcotics in an attempt to focus on the
source of the problem.'23 Policy-makers supporting decriminaliza-
tion do not want to squander manpower, administration, prison
space, and other law enforcement resources on mere drug addicts
and casual users while providing the opportunity for police extor-
tion.24 Such legislation was nearly enacted during the administra-
tion of former Mexican president Vicente Fox in 2006.125 During
that time, a decriminalization bill was approved by the Mexican
Senate; however, President Fox did not sign the bill into law due
to pressure from the U.S. under the administration of George W.
Bush.'26 Conversely, the Obama administration has not been out-
spoken on the Mexican government's decision to decriminalize,
and many commentators attribute this to approval.1 27 Conse-
quently, Mexico's current decriminalization bill, originally filed by
President Calderon in October 2008, was approved by the Mexican
Congress in April 2009, and officially went into effect in August
2009.12 The decriminalization policy is codified in Articles 478 and
479 of Mexico's General Law of Health 129 and has been colloquially
termed the "narcomenudeo decree," which translates to the law
against retail drug dealing. 3 ° Article 478 provides in pertinent
part:
The Public Ministry will not pursue penal action for the
crime detailed in the previous article [possession of drugs],
against an addict or consumer in possession of any of the
123. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
124. See discussion infra Part V for a description of how the prosecution of small-
scale drug possession has lead to unmanageable police extortion and bribery of drug
users in the field.
125. See Grillo, supra note 2.
126. See Grillo, supra note 2.
127. See Grillo, supra note 2.
128. See Grillo, supra note 2.
129. Ley General de Salud [LGS][General Health Laws], as amended, arts. 478,
479, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
130. Drug Law Reform in Latin America, TRANSNATIONAL INSTITUTE: DRUGS AND
DEMOCRACY, http://www.druglawreform.info/index.php?option=comflexicontent&
view=category&cid=105&Itemid=18&lang=en (last visited Jan. 12, 2010).
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narcotics detailed in the table [see table below], in equal or
less quantity than described in the same table, for strict
personal use .... The ministerial authority will inform the
consumer on the location of medical treatment institutions
or addiction prevention centers.
131
The Mexican government strongly maintains that the
decriminalization law stands for regulation of drugs, not legaliza-
tion. Under the terms of the legislation, anyone caught by law
enforcement with small amounts of marijuana, cocaine, heroin,
ecstasy, LSD, opium, or methamphetamine may not be prose-
cuted, imprisoned, or fined.132 The quantity of each drug that may
now be carried free of criminal prosecution differs based on inten-
sity of the drug.1 33 For example, people in Mexico may now legally
carry up to five grams of marijuana, but only up to one-half gram
of cocaine 4.13 These figures amount to an estimated three to four
joints of marijuana or four lines of cocaine respectively. 35 The fol-











Mexico's decriminalization policy is not unconditional.
Although possession of these limited quantities of illegal drugs is
no longer arrestable, the sale of drugs, even in quantities legal for
131. See Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, art. 478,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
132. Ley General de Salud [LGS][General Health Laws], as amended, art. 478,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
133. Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, art. 479,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
134. Ley General de Salud [LGS][General Health Laws], as amended, arts. 478,
479, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
135. See Grillo, supra note 2.
136. Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, art. 479,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
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possession remains a serious offense punishable by previous
law. 137 Additionally, establishments serving any quantity of drugs
will remain criminally liable under the new law. 13' Those who are
caught with an amount of drugs in excess of the law's minimum
guideline amount will face full criminal prosecution as well. 139
While the most noteworthy policy change under the
decriminalization law is the freedom to possess drugs without fear
of prosecution, a major provision under the law focuses on rehabil-
itating the 460,000 drug addicts in Mexico. Under the law, anyone
caught in possession of a decriminalized amount of drugs will be
"encouraged" to seek treatment, but for those caught a third time,
treatment is mandatory. 4 ' The perpetrator will then have her
name, address, and telephone number recorded by the police
officer, who will then send her personal information to Mexico's
Health Ministry.1 41 The Health Ministry will contact the citizen
and inform her of her residence.142 For those caught in possession
of drugs for a third time, rehabilitative treatment is mandatory.4
3
Although there is no provision in the decriminalization law setting
out precise punishment for repeat offenders who do not pursue
mandatory treatment, the practice in Mexico has been arrest and
incarceration.'1 Due to the law's focus on rehabilitation, a provi-
sion has been included to allocate funding to the construction of
310 new federal rehabilitation centers to handle the likely
increase in patients. 45 Further, the treatment offered by the
137. Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, art. 479,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.).
138. Ley General de Salud [LGS][General Health Laws], as amended, art. 477,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.). This provision was
expressly added to the decriminalization bill in an attempt to avoid the emergence of
establishments similar to "coffee shops" in Amsterdam which profit primarily from
mind-altering substances.
139. Ley General de Salud [LGS] [General Health Laws], as amended, arts. 478,
479, Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 7 de Febrero de 1984 (Mex.). See also Grillo,
supra note 2.
140. Stevenson, supra note 3.
141. Louis E.V. Nevaer, New Threat to Mexico's Drug Cartels: Rehab Center, NEW
AMERICA MEDIA (Sep. 12, 2009), http://news.newamericamedia.org/news/view-article.
html?article-id=4559bd69c4e883b4f39dac9e5dd76e94.
142. Id.
143. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
144. See Nevaer, supra note 141.
145. See Wilkinson, supra note 1 (demonstrating that many commentators believe
that there will be a significant shortage of rehabilitation centers in the near future
notwithstanding the construction of 310 new facilities); see also Hawley, supra note
49 (explaining that an additional problem that has arisen relating to drug
rehabilitation centers in Mexico is their location). Regina Kuri, spokeswoman for the
Monte Fenix Center for Advanced Studies in Mexico City, which trains drug
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Health Ministry's federal facilities will be completely free of
charge for those caught in possession of legal amounts of drugs.14
V. ANALYSIS OF MEXICO'S DECRIMINALIZATION POLICY
Considering Mexico's long history of failed law enforcement
and unprecedented drug-related violence, the Mexican govern-
ment's decriminalization policy is a refreshing change of strategy.
It is understandable that many policy-makers in Mexico and the
U.S. are outraged by the thought of Mexican citizens and interna-
tional spring-breakers running wild in the country with hard
drugs. Ideally, the Mexican government would prosecute both
drug traffickers and mere users in order to express its uncondi-
tional disapproval of illegal drugs; however, there are logical rea-
sons for not doing so."' The decriminalization policy could work to
conserve valuable law enforcement resources and eliminate a
widespread source of police corruption, while at the same time
offering rehabilitation to Mexico's staggering number of drug
addicts.14 Furthermore, because the decriminalization policy has
taken immediate effect, its intended benefits could materialize
quite rapidly. However, the decriminalization policy alone will not
be enough to transform the drug trafficking "culture" that has con-
sumed Mexico, and it must be followed by aggressive law enforce-
ment reform.
A. Conservation of Law Enforcement Resources
A predominant motive behind Mexico's decriminalization pol-
icy is conserving its limited and poorly structured law enforce-
ment resources.14 The logic follows that drug traffickers in Mexico
are far more elusive than drug addicts and mere users, and the
history of prosecuting users has tied up the very limited number
counselors, argues that many drug rehab facilities in Mexico are located in poor
neighborhoods. According to Kuri, the state does not have the money or resources to
send patients away to safer areas where they are shielded from temptation and
retribution.
146. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
147. See generally Turbiville, supra note 59. Mexican reform campaigners argue
that the relatively limited amount of jail space should not be filled with drug addicts
who present no real threat to society. See Rory Carroll, Jo Tuckman & Tom Phillips,
Mexico and Argentina Move Towards Decriminalising Drugs, GUARDIAN (Aug. 31,
2009, 2:07 PM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/aug/31/mexico-argentina-
decriminalise-drugs.
148. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
149. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
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of police officers, prisons, and courts.15 ° As indicated above, empiri-
cal evidence suggests that drug addicts are generally nonvio-
lent,15' and the new focus on the source of the drug trafficking
dilemma should be considered a wise measure given the devastat-
ing violence and corruption for which drug trafficking organiza-
tions are responsible. The record number of drug addicts in
Mexico has nearly doubled to 460,000 in the last five years
alone."' The relative ease with which Mexican police departments
have expended their resources on such prevalent and uncrafty
"criminal" drug users is extraordinary; meanwhile, drug traffick-
ing organizations have taken advantage of the law enforcement
deficiency.153 As the virtually harmless non-violent drug addicts
tie up police officers and occupy courtrooms and prison space in
Mexico, drug trafficking organizations aggressively introduce and
addict more and more Mexican citizens to their products. 54 In
essence, drug traffickers have benefited enormously from the
Mexican government's criminalization of drug possession and
President Calderon has recognized this pattern. By treating drug
addiction as a health problem rather than a crime under the
decriminalization policy, the Mexican government can offer
addicts treatment rather than allowing them to deplete the coun-
try's limited resources.
There is some validity to the argument that the Mexican gov-
ernment's resources will continue to deplete under the decriminal-
ization policy because Mexico cannot afford the rehabilitation of
drug addicts any more than it can afford to prosecute them. After
all, if Mexico were to send all of those guilty of small-scale drug
possession to rehabilitation centers, as the decriminalization pol-
icy recommends, then there would be no significant resource con-
servation due to the obligation to support an extreme influx of
rehabilitation patients. However, a complete shift in the place-
ment of drug addicts and casual users from prisons to rehabilita-
tion centers is unrealistic and therefore not the immediate goal of
the decriminalization policy. As stated above, the decriminaliza-
tion policy directs police only to encourage perpetrators to seek
rehabilitative treatment unless they are caught in possession of
150. See Wilkinson, supra note 1.
151. See Horowitz, supra note 7.
152. See Latin America Moves to Decriminalize, supra note 11.
153. See Carroll et al., supra note 147.
154. See Carroll et al., supra note 147; see also Alexis Okeowo, Addiction Explodes
in Mexico, CHRONICLE FOREIGN SERVICE (Feb. 8, 2009), http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-
02-08/news/171871731drug-users-cartels-drug-prevention.
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illegal drugs for the third time, in which case treatment is
mandatory.15 This lenient procedure toward non-repeat offenders,
along with commitments from both Mexico and the U.S. to build
hundreds of new federal rehabilitation facilities in Mexico,156 dem-
onstrates the Mexican government's recognition that the
decriminalization policy is merely the beginning of a new
approach that can lend itself to resource efficiency. For example,
as opposed to prisons in Mexico, many rehabilitation facilities in
Mexico are private institutions, and the decriminalization policy
could encourage private investment and construction of additional
facilities to take the burden off of government spending. Addition-
ally, drug addicts have historically been a large source of continu-
ous, petty crime5 7 that can be eliminated if the focus on
rehabilitation under the decriminalization policy is successful,
thereby easing the burden on law enforcement resources. Most
importantly, there is a considerable amount of data suggesting
that rehabilitation is far cheaper than prison altogether.5 ' Under
these circumstances, promoting the gradual shift of drug users
from prisons to rehabilitation centers could work to conserve the
Mexican government's meager resources.
While the decriminalization policy can conserve a considera-
ble amount of government resources and money, far more will be
required to put Mexico's law enforcement in a position to battle
formidable drug trafficking organizations effectively.15 9 Law
enforcemnt strategy as a whole must be perfected so that any
resource efficiency derived from decriminalization can be capital-
155. Stevenson, supra note 3. Many critics are appalled that the decriminalization
policy only recommends and does not require rehabilitative treatment for one caught
in possession of legal amounts of drugs until a third offense. Many believe this
demonstrates that the Mexican government's alleged health concerns for citizens is
merely a pretext to cover up a panicking government. See Phillip Smith, Mexico and
Argentina Enact Drug Decriminalization, STOPTHEDRUGWAR.ORG (Aug. 28, 2009),
http://stopthedrugwar.org/chronicle/2009/aug/28/feature-mexico-and-argentina-ena.
156. See Nevaer, supra note 141.
157. See JAMEs P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN Do
ABOUT IT: A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 29 (2001).
158. See Portillo, supra note 63 (providing studies which reveal that imprisonment
is the most expensive way to deal with criminals in Mexico); see also Joseph B.
Treaster, Prisoners, and Prisons, Gain From Drug Therapy, N.Y. TiMEs, Nov. 16,
1992, at B4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1992/11/16/nyregion/prisoners-and-
prisons-gain-from-drug-therapy.html (stating that the high cost of imprisonment can
likely be attributed to the need for adequate security to house criminals in the form of
infrastructure and staffing). In the U.S., it can cost up to $100,000 to build a single
prison cell. Additionally, prisoners with severe health problems create extreme
financial obligations for the state.
159. See generally SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16.
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ized upon.16 Mexico must establish effective coordination among
federal, state, and municipal police forces, especially with respect
to data collection, communication, and operational planning.'' As
one branch of law enforcement obtains information, it must be
immediately made available to other branches to ensure efficient
use of manpower. This form of communication has never been per-
fected by the Mexican government despite extraordinary techno-
logical breakthroughs in computer programming.162 Consequently,
important criminal information, including complaints, witness
statements, and investigative reports are not recorded on a relia-
ble database for institutional reference. 63 To address this concern,
much of the Merida Initiative funding from the U.S. has been
dedicated to strengthening communications within law enforce-
ment.' It will be up to the Mexican government to capitalize on
this opportunity by establishing effective communication among
law enforcement branches once and for all.
Furthermore, it is equally important for Mexican law enforce-
ment to take advantage of modern technology relating to surveil-
lance, forensic science, and rapid response of police units. As it
stands, drug trafficking organizations in Mexico operate on a far
more sophisticated level than law enforcement in terms of contem-
porary equipment. 16 The primitive methods by which Mexican
police forces respond to crimes and investigate crimes leave no
curiosity as to why drug trafficking organizations have dominated
the country. Traffickers utilize state-of-the-art surveillance and
communication hardware to track law enforcement and facilitate
cross-border drug smuggling.166 Meanwhile, until recently, the
Mexican government lacked simple X-ray equipment to inspect
vehicles entering the country, and its inspection capacity remains
limited. Curbing this disparity will be difficult due to the Mexican
government's poor financial situation; however, wise spending in
terms of law enforcement technology can be economical. Because
ninety-five percent of a typical law enforcement budget is spent on
labor, shifting tasks from personnel to modern technology can cut
160. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 13-19.
161. See discussion supra Part III(A); see also SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at
18-19.
162. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 18-19.
163. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 18-19.
164. See MERIDA INITIATIVE: FACTS SHEET, supra note 34.
165. See discussion supra Part III(B).
166. U.S. NATIONAL DRUG INTELLIGENCE CENTER, NATIONAL DRUG THREAT
ASSESSMENT 2009 (2008).
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substantial costs. 167 The Mexican government must learn from
other nations that have mastered the modernization of law
enforcement and update their antiquated practices. While Mex-
ico's decriminalization policy promises appreciable resource effi-
ciency, the Mexican government cannot expect to put an end to
the drug trafficking dilemma until these more substantial
changes are implemented.
B. Reducing Police Corruption
Another essential purpose of the decriminalization policy
relates to police corruption and bribery. The Mexican state police
have been exceptionally prone to corruption for generations. The
power to arrest drug users for possession of illegal drugs has
afforded corrupt police officers more opportunity to bribe and
extort.176 Simple statistics illustrate this point. From December
2006 to August 2009, there have been over 15,000 police searches
related to drug possession or small-scale dealing resulting in the
detainment of just fewer than 100,000 people.168 Interestingly,
only twelve to fifteen percent of this large number of detainees
was ever charged.169 The large gap between those detained and
those charged can be attributed to two features of police corrup-
tion: extortion and lack of evidence. Before the decriminalization
policy, police officers were able to use the criminality of small-
scale drug possession to bribe potential offenders. If the victim
were in fact in possession of illegal drugs, police would threaten
stiff jail sentences and ask for money or property to avoid charges.
Bernardo Espino del Castillo of the Mexican Attorney General's
office, who confirms that this was a major consideration in the
enactment of the decriminalization policy, confirmed the preva-
lence of police extortion in small-scale drug arrests. 7 ° The new
drug laws seek to prevent this type of extortion and promote honor
and trustworthiness within the Mexican state police forces.
Many opponents of the decriminalization policy contend that
the law will not be effective in battling corruption. The argument
follows that if police officers are corrupt, it does not matter what
the law holds because corrupt police officers do not follow the
law. 17' It is no secret that, with respect to corruption, the
167. See id.
168. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
169. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
170. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
171. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
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decriminalization policy is under inclusive because police officers
who rely on substantial payoffs directly from drug trafficking
organizations will remain corrupt regardless of whether they can
extort drug users under the new law.172 However, as the above-
mentioned statistics demonstrate, police extortion in Mexico is
incredibly substantial, and it promotes wrongdoing and untrust-
worthiness of the institution of law enforcement. Quite conceiva-
bly, small-time police extortion could very well be a first step in
the development of more extreme corruption because it desensi-
tizes young, impressionable police officers to immorality. While
the U.S. continues to provide economic aid to the Mexican govern-
ment for law enforcement, much of which is dedicated to police
training and phasing out corruption, eliminating any source of
corruption is essential. The decriminalization policy can effec-
tively do away with police extortion relating to small-scale drug
possession, and should be considered a positive measure given the
police corruption epidemic in Mexico.
Despite this promising step, Mexican police forces are so
deeply infected with corruption that merely eliminating small-
time police extortion will not suffice to transform the culture of
law enforcement. Putting an end to the corruption epidemic will
be difficult, but there are additional steps that must be taken in
order to initiate significant change. First and foremost, police
officers must be paid higher wages. As the average police officer
earns the equivalent of $700 per month, the temptation of large
payoffs from drug trafficking organizations has proved to be irre-
sistible.172 Additionally, such poor earnings can instill indignity
and lack of self-worth in police officers, which in turn discourages
pride in law enforcement. The Mexican government must find a
way to better compensate state police officers, whether it be
through restructuring domestic expenses or Merida funds from
the U.S. 174 The U.S. has apportioned a significant amount of
Merida funding to improving police officer training; however, it
should be considered equally important to provide funding for the
increase of police officer wages. Doing so will make drug cartel
payoffs less desirable for impoverished police officers while pro-
moting honor within the institution of law enforcement. Strength-
ening Mexico's national security is of high importance in both
172. See supra Part III for information regarding the prevalence of police officer
payoffs from drug trafficking organizations.
173. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16, at 17-18.
174. See MERIDA INITIATIVES: FACTS SHEET, supra note 34.
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Mexico and the U.S.,17 and in their cooperation in this matter, the
need to increase police officer wages must be recognized and
addressed.
Moreover, police officer recruiting standards must be
improved to build an immunity to police corruption. While police
academies in Mexico do have educational standards, they are gen-
erally not enforced, and the majority of Mexican police officers
have completed only elementary school or less.176 This has led to a
culture of undisciplined, under qualified police officers that are
especially susceptible to corruption.'77 Eliminating police miscon-
duct and corruption will require recruitment of reasonably edu-
cated candidates with integrity and a passion for justice. The
continued practice of empowering any person off the street with
authority to enforce the law will not serve the Mexico's drug war
well. As the Mexican government continues to wage war against
drug cartels, it must ensure that recruiting standards are
enforced at police academies across the country to ensure quality
law enforcement that will remain impervious to corruption.
Phasing out corruption in Mexico will not happen overnight,
nor will it be accomplished by any single measure. The corruption
epidemic should be attacked at all angles while the Mexican gov-
ernment effectively strengthens its law enforcement system. Most
importantly, Mexico must improve its ability to protect witnesses
and other targets of drug trafficking organizations so police
officers can comfortably refuse bribes without fear of being mur-
dered. Achieving this level of security could take decades due to
Mexico's lack of state funding and slow-moving legislative
processes. 178 In the meantime, decriminalizing small-scale drug
possession alone will not end police corruption, nor is it intended
to.'79 The decriminalization policy is merely a positive start in
Mexico's goal of chipping away at the corruption epidemic.
C. Mexico's Drug Addiction Problem
Perhaps the most promising objective of Mexico's decriminal-
ization policy deals with the country's rising drug addiction.
Throughout Mexico's history of criminalizing drug possession,
175. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16.
176. Benjamin Reames, Police Forces in Mexico: A Profile, PROJECT ON REFORMING
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN MEXICO (May 15, 2003), http://escholarship.org/uc/
item/lsq4g254jsessionid=8C8F85A9DD8FCD424AC6BCE91FB 1B16D#page-1.
177. See Cevallos, supra note 78.
178. See SCHAEFER ET AL., supra note 16.
179. See Stevenson, supra note 3.
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there was no distinction between ruthless drug traffickers and
less harmful drug addicts. Furthermore, the law did not distin-
guish between the criminal nature of drug trafficking and per-
sonal drug use except for penalties imposed.18 0 The drug addicts
who presented no real threat to society were sentenced to prison
without regard for rehabilitation or education. Upon release from
custody, these addicts would return to the streets in search of
drugs and enrich trafficking organizations until their next
encounter with law enforcement. Now, the Mexican government
essentially treats the extraordinary number of Mexican drug
addicts as offenders of public health laws rather than criminal
laws.' This allows the Mexican government to address not only
the country's unprecedented drug addiction problem, but also
allows for concentration on trafficking organizations. The United
Nations, in its 2009 World Drug Report, gave credence to this con-
cept, asserting that decriminalization "keep[s] drugs out of the
hands of those who would avoid them under a system of full prohi-
bition, while encouraging treatment, rather than incarceration,
for users."8 2
This concept of decriminalizing drug possession to promote
rehabilitation is not unprecedented, and has proved to be enor-
mously successful in Portugal."3 In 2001, Portugal lifted criminal
sanctions for all drugs in an attempt to control its rising drug
addiction problem. 8 4 Under the law, all persons guilty of possess-
ing small amounts of drugs are sent to social workers and psychol-
ogists to discuss rehabilitation instead of jail.' While many
critics in the socially conservative country expressed concern that
decriminalization would perpetuate Portugal's drug problem,
results since 2001 have been extremely favorable."88 Studies have
shown that, since Portugal decriminalized drug possession in
2001, the country has been able to dramatically improve its ability
to encourage drug addicts to seek rehabilitative help. 87As a result,
180. See Smith, supra note 155.
181. See Smith, supra note 155. Recall the terms of the Mexican decriminalization
law which provide offenders with free treatment options rather than jail time.
182. U.N. OFFICE OF DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT (2009), at 168.
183. See Maia Szalavitz, Drugs in Portugal: Did Decriminalization Work?, TIME




187. See generally Glenn Greenwald, Drug Decriminalization in Portugal: Lessons
for Creating Fair and Successful Drug Policies, CATO INSTITUTE (Apr. 2, 2009), http:/!
www.cato.org/pubs/wtpapers/greenwald-whitepaper.pdf.
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the number of drug addicts seeking rehabilitative treatment in
Portugal more than doubled since 2001.188 Meanwhile, illegal drug
use among teens and drug-related deaths have steadily
declined. 9 This success can be attributed to the fact that the most
substantial barrier to the rehabilitation of drug addicts before
Portugal's decriminalization was the addicts' fear of criminal
sanctions upon seeking help. 9 ° The decriminalization policy in
Portugal has eliminated addicts' fear of prison and motivated
them to face their addictions. Consequently, once a country known
for its widespread drug addiction, Portugal's current drug use
rates for almost every drug are far lower than Europe generally.'
Additionally, critics' fears of Portugal turning into a "drug tour-
ism" destination have not materialized.' 9' Not surprisingly, policy-
makers in Portugal are virtually unanimous in their support of
decriminalization, and there has been no serious political push to
return to criminalization. 19'
VI. CONCLUSION
The general theme of the Mexican government's decriminal-
ization policy is desperation. Mexico is in a state of total chaos, as
statistics concerning drug trafficking, cartel violence, and police
corruption across the country are staggering. Mexico's dilemma
has gotten so tumultuous that just its secondary effects in the U.S.
have warranted over $1.4 billion in U.S. taxpayer money to com-
bat drug trafficking. 94 Traditional "zero tolerance" drug policies
have failed in Mexico for generations because they tend to create
optimal conditions for drug traffickers to thrive. 95 The Mexican
government desperately needed to implement a fresh approach to
law enforcement concerning drug trafficking, and the decriminal-
ization of small-scale drug possession was a rational attempt to
implement change. 96 However, the decriminalization policy alone
will not fix Mexico's broken law enforcement system, nor will it
188. Id.
189. See id.
190. See id. at 6-9 (stating that Joao Castel-Branco Goulao, the chairman of
Portugal's principal drug policy agency, the Institute on Drugs and Drug Addiction,
confirmed that a predominant reason for Portugal's decriminalization to encourage
rehabilitation by eliminating drug addicts' fear of criminal prosecution).
191. See id. at 22.
192. See id. at 6.
193. See id. at 28.
194. See U.S. Delays Counternarcotics Aid, supra note 34.
195. See discussion supra Part V of this note.
196. See Carroll et al., supra note 147 (providing that immediately upon writing the
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put an end to the stranglehold drug trafficking organizations have
on the country. The Mexican government must continue to
revamp and strengthen the institution of law enforcement
through improved conditions and wages for police officers, police
training, equipment, witness protection programming, and sys-
tematic coordination and communication among branches of law
enforcement. Without such improvements, drug trafficking orga-
nizations will always be a step ahead of law enforcement and will
continue to haunt the country.
The decriminalization of illegal drug possession is not unprec-
edented. Colombia's highest court declared the criminalization of
drug possession unconstitutional in 1994.197 In 2001, Portugal offi-
cially eliminated all criminal penalties for drug possession, which
has proved to be remarkably successful. 198 The Brazilian govern-
ment passed a decriminalization bill similar to that in Mexico in
2006, where rehabilitative treatment may be required in lieu of
incarceration. 99 Today, decriminalization continues to gain world-
wide approval around the globe. The Argentine Supreme Court,
like Brazil, declared the unconstitutionality of drug possession
just four days after Mexico's decriminalization became law. Simi-
lar legislation can be expected in Uruguay and Ecuador in the
near future.20 0 This trend is most common in countries where law
enforcement resources make the prosecution of mere drug users
unfeasible, but the potential benefits of decriminalization extend
far beyond resource efficiency. Could the U.S. be next in line to
decriminalize the possession of small amounts of illegal drugs?
Many commentators believe that the U.S. will face pressure to
decriminalize if it is determined to be a success in Mexico. 21 Skep-
tics of this possibility ought to wonder why the Obama adminis-
tration was utterly silent during the passing of Mexico's
decriminalization bill.
decriminalization bill into law, the Mexican government essentially reduced drug
traffickers' potential to profit and corrupt state police).
197. See Smith, supra note 155.
198. See Szalavitz, supra note 183.
199. See Szalavitz, supra note 183.
200. See Smith, supra note 155.
201. See Carrol et al., supra note 147. Where Walter McKay, spokesman for
Mexico's Institute for Security and Democracy, predicts that the U.S. will be inclined
to consider legalization or decriminalization when its fear of a narco-tourist boom in
Mexico does not occur. Id.
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